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Two symbolic systems: public and private

There is no social behavior without communication (Evans & Bastian, 1969). Few species exist which do not possess a substantial repertoire of symbolic communicative devices such as vocalizations, displays, postures, and/or gestures. Also, many species exhibit behaviors that express an symbolic processing of external reality (Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984). But these two symbolic systems remain separate with little conceptual or featural overlap in nearly all species but one, humans. In overlapping our two symbol systems, we have become the paragon of animals, to quote one of us.

This integration is not complete. Many elements of communication such as phonemes or words, are used extensively in representational roles while others are hardly used at all, such as gestures or postures. Some aspects of our representations are cannot readily be communicated (e.g., the tip-of-the-tongue experience). To what degree are these two symbol systems integrated in humans? Do other mammals also use symbols which possess (public)communicational as well as private (representational) elements, and to what degree? What is the nature of communicative and representational integration? Which neural systems are responsible for this integration in humans? In other mammals? Does this integration alter either system?

Language instruction in animals (e.g., ape language research) provides a structured environment in which variables can be isolated and explored, which is not so easy to do with humans. Premack (1985) found evidence for integration of communicative and representational systems in the behavior of a common chimpanzee. According to Premack (1985) words have two functions in human language: (1) the external function of words is to retrieve or communicate information; and (2) the word serves as an intrinsic part of mental representation. He tested (1) the communicative function of lexigrams (plastic word) by determine how effective each lexigram was evoking a mental representation in a chimpanzee (troglodyte). He found that the most salient physical feature of a fruit for a chimpanzee was color: specific colors were effective in retrieving the animal's mental representation of the object. However, names were even more effective (e.g., fewest errors in tests). Consequently, lexigrams (plastic words) proved to be extremely effective communicative devices. To test (2) the representational function of a word, he applied a phenomena observed in the performance of matching to sample testing in apes. A blue triangle (lexigram), which refers to a red apple, can be matched to a red patch of color correctly; but a blue-painted apple cannot be matched to a red patch. Somehow a blue-painted word evokes a red apple whereas a blue-painted apple does not evoke a red apple. Either the blue apple is not recognized as an apple (which is very unlikely), or perception of a blue apple interferes with the representation of a red one. He found that perception of a distorted example of an object adversely influences the representation of a normal example of this object . Premack (1985) terms this the impairment effect. The adverse effect occurs within the same form of representation only (an object must be compared to another object). Evidence for an impairment effect of words would indicate that physical features of a word are being represented by a chimpanzee. It turns out that perception of a distorted word (orange triangle) does interfere with representation of a normal word (blue triangle). Chimpanzees find it difficult to match a distorted lexigram for apple (orange triangle) with a blue patch (normal color of word for apple). In contrast, chimpanzees could match blue-painted apples with a red patch of color . The impairment effect arises when perception and representation of the same form of information (lexigram and lexigram, or object and object) are incompatible. The impairment effect does not occur when perception and representation of different forms of information (lexigram and object) are incompatible. There is no impairment effect between word and referent; only when referent and referent or word and word are incompatible in same way does the effect arise. The impairment effect is offers a powerful tool, albeit complicated, for comparing mental representations of different species, and different levels of development within these species. Premack (1985) concluded that, like human words, plastic lexigrams possessed both representational and communicative functions. In spite of this demonstration of mental continuity, the degree of integration of representational and communicative systems may still quantitatively separate human and nonhuman experiences.

How is human language different than other communication systems? Humans have developed many communication systems that have little to do with language (e.g., stop lights). A definition of language would be useful here; but herein lies some of the difficulty of studying this problem: there is no explanatory nor conceptual definition which is widely agreed upon. Chomsky (1980), for example, states that the most elementary property of human language is that it involves a "denumerable infinity of functionally distinct expressions", which also describes the system of mathematics. And the productivity of human language is not infinite, but specific to those discernable elements in the social and physical problem-space of human experience (e.g., Parker, 1985). One fact is certain: language is a behavior that has certain consequences, and these consequences are in terms of representation and communication. An utterance has both an ideational meaning and interpersonal meaning or social purpose (Parker, 1985). Language conveys propositional and referential information and it provides alternative ways of expressing ideas as well as means for the speaker to communicate effectively, engagingly, appropriately (Parker, 1985). The system of language consists of hierarchically organized levels of processing (i.e., phonology, morphology, semantics, syntax, pragmatics) and consists of a number of design features (Hockett, 1960). Vauclair (1990) provides a useful conceptual definition of language: Language is a system that is both communicational and representational, grounded in a social convention that attributes to certain substitutes (signifiers) the power to designate other substitutes (referents). But was the process of integrating representational and communicational symbol systems abrupt or gradual?

When did language evolve?

There are nearly as many questions about language evolution as there are theories, which probably number only slightly fewer than languages in the world. When did language evolve? Why did language evolve? How did language evolve? What effects did it have on behavior and cognition? When and how did primate vocalizations come to be supplemented, transformed, or replaced by the system of human language may be answerable. The transformation from ape to hominid entailed some hundred morphological, physiological, and behavioral evolutionary changes (Wind, 1981). However, the changes may not been radical alterations. For instance, according to Wind (1981) the morphology of the apes' vocal apparatus cannot account for their inability to speak. He argues that the primate pharynx and airway were preadapted for speech-like vocalizations ever since the origins of the anthropoids. "(I)f a chimpanzee larynx could be grafted into an otherwise normal human being and if all the nerves could be connected such a human individual would be able to produce vocalizations and speech hardly or not discernible from the normal ones." The development of the association and motor areas of the brain was decisive for the origin of language as we know it. Falk (1980) also questions the supposed late appearance of a modern articulatory apparatus, saying that fossil reconstructions have been insufficient to determine if qualitative alterations have occurred. Wind (1982) believes that if the anthropoid vocal tracts were properly wired neurologically, apes would be capable of producing a sufficient variety of sounds to demonstrate at least some rudimentary speech. Fossils of Australopithecus robustus display an upper respiratory system closely akin to that of modern nonhuman primates, particularly apes. Subsequently, Laitman (1981) concludes that this species possessed a limited range of vocalizations. Fossils of Homo erectus, however, show a descent of the larynx, which would enable (with the pharynx) a greater range of vocalizations than possible to Australopithecines. An upper respiratory system similar to that of modern man, with a vocal apparatus enabling human speech, is found as early as 300,000 years ago in archaic Homo sapiens. Lieberman (1985) reports that major changes to the upper respiratory systems have taken place in the last 250,000 years; that even Neanderthal hominids retained most of features of the nonhuman supralaryngeal airway and would not have been able to encode speech as rapidly as even archaic Homo sapiens.

Language is more than rapid vocal behavior. Tobias (1987) reports that Homo habilis possessed a prominent Broca's area in the posterior part of the left inferior convolution, which exceeds the prominence found in homologous areas in Australopithecus africanus . The pattern of sulci in this region of the brain of Homo habilis is comparable with that of modern humans and much different from apes. The area around the parioeto-occipto-temporal junction (i.e., Wernicke's area) shows especially strong development in all endocasts of H. habilis skulls. But he find no evidence of laterality (i.e., pronounced development more pronounced on one side than the other). However asymmetry of the Sylvian fissure is indicated by impressions in the endocranical walls of Homo sapiens neanderthalsis, Homo erectus, and even Australopithecus africanus (LeMay & Geschwind, 1975). However, the first true speech sounds may not have been uttered until very recently. Among the many neuroanatomical changes which occur during the hominidization process, there has been a progressive complication of the vascular system, particularly surrounding the sylvian region of the brain. As recently as 30,000 years ago, endocranial wall impressions of Cro Magnon humans were complicated, indicating better vascularization of the sylvian region than those humans who preceded them; but these impressions suggest that the vascular system was not developed enough to support speech. It was not until neolithic times (10-12,000 years ago) that first fossils which possess a "squaring of the parietal meningeal vascular system" are found, which indicates that humans now possessed the developed vascularization necessary for speech (Saban, 1981). Jaynes (1976a) argues that the evolution of speech cannot be detected by fossil remains (i.e., a skill may by physiologically possible but latent). However, the origins of spoken language, the acquisition of words, etc., may have produced behavioral changes in those hominids which possessed speech, and these cultural/behavioral changes may be reflected in the artefacts left behind. According to Jaynes (1976a), speech produced three changes which benefitted hominids: (1) spoken words enable one to train attention on specific salient features of objects and events (in contrast, feral children have more difficulty training attention, possibly due to however other factors besides lack of language; (2) verbal labelling also facilitates recalls (cf. Herman, 1986, analogous ability in dolphins); and (3) language allows one to code and compare attributes of objects verbally, thereby freeing us from the momentary perceptual impact of one attribute or another.

When did speech originate in hominid? First, the supposed radical change from a primate communication system to language must have occurred at a time where its benefits outweighed in disadvantages (e.g., greater likelihood of choking). When was there great enough ecological pressure to evoke such a change? Glaciation was likely the strongest ecological force at act upon hominid evolution. Each Ice age, lasting approximately 70,000 years, would have brought about a change in the habits and livelihood of hominids living at the time. There have been four major glacial periods since the transformation of H. erectus through archaic H. sapiens to H. sapiens sapiens: the coldest periods being approximately 600,000, 400,000, 150,000, and 35,000 years ago. Warm interglacial periods are probably without sufficient ecological challenge to provide language with any new survival value if it had developed during these periods. As mentioned above, the brain structures which mediate language -- Broca's area in frontal lobe, Wernicke's area around the Sylvian fissure, and the supplementary motor cortex -- are not strongly developed until H. habilis. The artefacts left behind from H. habilis and H. erectus were crude, suggesting little change from those of Australopithecines. The complete development of language was not likely. Although there was some progression in tool manufacture during the first three glaciation, the change was very gradual. Speech subsequently must have originated during the fourth glaciation. This age was characterized by large swings of temperature, beginning 70,000 years ago, achieving its coldest period about 35,000 BC. Normal temperatures returned around 8000 BC. An explosion of artefacts and new technologies coincides with the middle of the last ice age, approximately 40 -35,000 BC (Jaynes, 1976a). The human brain had reached its present proportions (including its present-day increase in frontal lobes) between 250,000 to 100,000 years ago. Applying these time constraints, Jaynes (1976a) places the origin of speech at approximately 40,000 BC. Some recent findings in South Africa would probably push this back to 80,000 BC.

Attempts to reconstruct the earliest languages (e.g., Indo-European languages from 2000 BC) by linguists and anthropologists suggest that these languages were as complex as modern languages. If there has been little change in linguistic complexity in 4000 years, how much change could there have been in 40,000. The stability of language complexity suggests a prolonged phylogeny of language, possibly stretching back million of years. The rapid change in technology may not indicates a rapid change in cognition and linguistic capacities. Perhaps what occurred at this time of great cultural change was a cultural shift. Language may have already been present before this period, but the means and value of acquiring knowledge may have changed; knowledge itself gained a new value, beyond its value for helping to achieve an immediate goal. For the first time the distribution of labor may have included individuals who were not primarily hunters or plant gatherers but whose sole social function involved the transmission and storage of information, such as shamans, wise man, etc. The cognitive capabilities of humans probably have not change qualitatively since the evolution of language; however investigating the change in tools and artefacts (e.g., from stone tools to cities and nuclear power plants) are the work of the same intelligence. The rise of industrialization via mass automation marks a change in an individual's relationship to the process of knowledge acquisition. The individual contributes to his own knowledge as well as serve the cultural knowledge base.

Why did language evolve?

Why did language evolve? What ecological or social pressures resulted in the development of speech? Gibson (1981) places the selection pressure within child-parent communication. The dietary niche of hominids -- omnivorous, extractive foraging with tools -- resulted in offspring depending heavy on parental guidance for long periods of time. Sophisticated recognition of requests for aid, for instance, for a specific tool or food item, would have required greater sensitivity between communicants. According to Jerison (1988) early hominids invaded an environmental niche (social predator) that was inappropriate for primates in critical ways. The niche of a social predator required behavioral and morphological adaptations which were not present at the time, nor likely to develop. Living species in this niche (e.g., wolves) must navigate, control, and defend an extensive territory and range. A scent marking system is ideal for differentiating territories (e.g., urine cues). Higher primates, with reduced olfactory system, would likely have had to rely on their most developed system, that is, the auditory-vocal system, to contribute to the same kind of cognitive mapping of the external world. Maintenance of these cognitive maps over time required active participation. This could be done by "linguistically-labelling" landmarks (e.g., a river labelled by a particular whistle; an old tree by a phoneme-like sound). Construction of these sensory map overlapped with the primate communication system (i.e., occurred in same modality). This may account for "the peculiar feature of human language." In language humans share a constructed reality; whereas animal communication (apparently) consists of primarily direct commands about behaviors. "Self-consciousness (arose) to distinguish the reality generated by one's own information (sensory, linguistic, etc.) from the reality generated by verbal information from another individual." (cf. Jaynes, 1976b). Livingstone (1981) also argues a similar origin of language. However, those mammals which do exhibit territorial vocalizations possess small territories, where all regions of the territory are within easy auditory proximity. Baboons and chimpanzees, who usually occupy large home ranges not unlike hominid hunters, possess no specialized territorial displays. Fischer (1981) postulates a vocal onomatopoetic theory. Speech originated in the "magical" imitation of other species' cries (food calls, mating calls). Such strange, less human vocalization would have allowed humans a closer approach to prey than ordinary cries. Unlike earlier hypotheses, there is some present-day support for this theory. For example, Amazon basin Indians imitate 35 different species, not to mention the wide use of decoys in hunting.The ability to imitate a wide variety of sounds of prey, and other environmental sounds as well, would have been selected for, as well as the imitation of postures, movements, and gestures (Fischer,1981). This theory is intuitively appealing in that, in essence, it means that Nature, the elements, taught human to speak. Many researchers (e.g., Falk, 1980) posit that deitic and iconic gestures were originally used to communicative references during hunts, etc., which were slowly supplanted by vocal referents. This may explain the ubiquitous supportive presence of gestures during speech. However, individual communications may have evolved not to describe the physical world as much as the social world (cf. Bateson, 1966; Humphreys, 1976).

How did language evolve?

How did language develop? Did it developed in parallel with cognitive abilities? Is it true that "language is less a gift of the gods than an exploitation of the primate potential" (Desmond, 1979)? Gibson (1981) compares the acquisition of object manipulation with the acquisition of language skills, In phylogeny and ontogeny both of these abilities mature through differentiation of existing behaviors into smaller component parts, whose parts are combined and recombined into new and varied behavioral patterns (see above). This occurs vocally, semantically, and syntactically. Gradually, through babbling, infantile coos differentiate into phonemes, which are combinable into a virtually infinite variety of words. Similarly, the semantic meaning conveyed by a child's first utterances is not clearly differentiated and parents must judge from the immediate context of the utterance. For example, the utterance "milk" made by a young child could indicate the simple recognition of milk, or the desire for a drink of milk. As grammatical and semantic skills developed, the child becomes capable of constructing sentences with various distinct meanings. In terms of syntactical constructions, the speech of children begins with single word utterances. Gradual increases on the mean length of utterances occurs during the second and third years, coinciding with the development of grammatical competence (Brown, 1980). The first grammatical constructions are those of simple position: e.g., agent-action-object. The ability to differentiate agent and object on the basis of more complex grammatical rules (as in "the girl is kissed by the boy" or "the girl that the boy kissed") does not emerge until about five to six years of age (Limber, 1980). Children at this age can construct hierarchical embedded structures and are able to judge the meaning of an utterance by the sum total of grammatical features, rather than by a single feature or position alone.

A constructional theory of the origin of language postulates a close correspondence between the communicative and tool-using abilities of primates (Reynolds,1981). (This theory is particularly interesting in light of the possible dissociation of these capacities in the two Pan species). According to this type of theory, the precursor of human linguistic structure may be found in anthropoid constructional ability in which objects are arranged into new functional configurations (such as a ladder). Constructional actions possess the following properties of (1) intentionality, (2) high-speed execution of both sequential and simultaneous constituents, (3) the creation of a new entity from constituent parts, (4) recursiveness, (5) generalization to new contexts, and (6) nesting of one operation within another. Ape ladder building has been observed in captivity. Elements of this skill which parallel the structure of human language are: (1) extensive practice of voluntary motor movements; (2) ladders can be built quickly; (3) new construction not reducible to constituent behaviors (no single element of ladder permits the ape to climb higher); (4) each pole in one ladder is often used in functionally different ways or positions in constructing other ladders (evidence of recursive application);(5) the ability is generalized to new contexts, with different poles, different locations; (6) behaviors are nested in that the output of one support operation is used as the input to another; and there is no implicitly correct order of actions in ladder construction, actions are executed within a hierarchical tree structure. Individual apes build each ladder, but it is use socially to the extent that others often hold or steady the ladder as others are climbing it. Hence, human language is the product of general evolutionary changes of primate constructional ability (Reynolds, 1981).

Gibson (1981) rejects constructional accounts of linguistic development which are closely tied to tool use. Gestures like tool use and object manipulation both depend upon differentiation and construction in visual and manual modes, but speech depends on vocal and auditory modes. The difference between the abilities in the two species of Pan may indicating some evolutionary divergence between vocal skills and the capacity for object manipulation. Neuropsychological evidence indicate that the highest constructional levels of tool use and language use are both mediated by the inferior parietal and anterior frontal association areas. For instance, lesions in these areas can result in any of the following: ideational apraxia (inability to use objects properly), ideomotor apraxia (inability to imitate gestures), inability to name objects, and inability to understand or construct complex grammatical relationships. But she notes that while aphasics need not be apraxic, in general apraxic patients are usually always aphasia (Gibson, 1981). She concludes that the synchrony between maturation of object manipulation and language skills, in light of neuropsychological evidence, reflects two closely tied but separate neurological processes.

This does not deny a possible fundamental parallel between language and skilled movement sequences. Complex motor skills are hierarchically organized: i.e., "the responses contained in a movement sequence exist as sets of sequential dependencies that effect the probability of subsequent responses" (Gibson,1981, pp.20-21). Calvin (1988) suggests the sequential processing involved in syntactical processing was first developed in complex motor sequences, such as throwing objects to hit targets. The sequence of muscle commands which are necessary for walking or breathing may be viewed as a preadaptation for rule-governed syntactical processing (Lieberman, 1981). Gregory (1970) suggests that the rule-governed nature of human language is an extension of neural rules that order retinal patterns into objects. The phylogeny of language involved a "take-over operation" in which humans exploited the development of the visual system in higher primates to structure vocal signalling: representational and perceptual processes were integrated with communicative processes.

Human language is a communication system that is also a cognitive system . The first steps toward complete integration of representational and communicative systems in the mammalian brain probably began millions of years ago. Considering general ecological, morphological, and perceptual constraints, cetaceans seem best suited, among all mammals, to develop communal constructions of reality. Strangely, there is little evidence of a theory of mind in dolphins, positive or negative. Accounts of altruistic acts by cetaceans are many, and even some behaviors which border on pedagogy, but few if any empirical tests have been designed to investigate this issue. There is anecdotal evidence of dolphins behaving as if they are aware of the existence of other minds. Do dolphins monitor the effects of signals that they emit and change their behaviors accordingly? It may be premature to answer now. Behaviors which are illicit and punishable are often performed only when a dolphin believes no one is around (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh and Hopkins, 1986). When a dolphin squirts water at a human (to show annoyance), he will often raise his head out of the water to curiously observe the effect his behavior had on the unsuspecting victim (personal observation). Both examples show an awareness of effects one's behavior has on others. Dolphins demonstrate what Pryor (1986) calls insightful behavior. An experienced animal will "check out" a training criteria by running through a series of variations on a learned behavior. Development of a productive communicative skills in dolphins, such as mimicry, would benefit many areas of investigation. "Future work on artificial systems should pursue the development of phoneme-like set of recombinable sound patterns which optimize perceptual distinctiveness and reproducibility" (Richards, 1986). The integration of representational and communicative systems, as partly demonstrated by the impairment effect (Premack, 1985), have yet to be extensively explored in dolphins. Even instruction in the use of lexigram systems would start to resolve some questions concerning dolphin cognitive and linguistic abilities.

The human brain appears to better organized to impose structure on visual data than on auditory data, and in the dolphins the reverse may be true. Forestell and Herman (1986) report indirect evidence that an object is more an object (e.g., perceived as contiguous) when it is heard than when it is seen by a dolphin. The kind of self that might be constructed by dolphins probably involves acoustic more than visual inputs. Echolocation shares an unusual structural feature with human language: its contribution to the reality constructed by the brain may depend on a signal generated by other animals. Various social interactions in bats, such as foraging and agonistic behaviors, depend on the ability to intercept the vocal signals of others (Fenton, 1980). Why did many species of dolphins attain such large brains? In view of their high cost, we must propose enhancements of data from echolocation (Jerison, 1988). Co-occurrence of communicative and perceptual processes in the same modality would create tremendous pressure for a communally-shared symbol system. Echolocating animals can possibly share raw acoustic information, unprocessed, the very elements from which representational and communicative codes are developed. Integration of representational and communicative systems in dolphins may not be as much a unifying process as less segregation at the outset. Lilly (1967) believed that dolphins were unable to distinguish their sonar from their communications. One's concept of self is tied to the ways and degree of acquiring knowledge. Sharing the very vividness of natural objects would result in intense group cohesion with a reduction of individuating processes. This communal experience may change the boundaries of the self: many members of a group may act as a "decision-making unit" (Jerison, 1986).

Different animals are conscious of different aspects of their world, from proprioceptive body awareness to awareness of agency and social agency (Cheney & Seyfarth). The extent of mental attribution in humans ("linguistic self consciousness", Crook, 1983) may be a consequence of extensive integration of representational and communicative systems, channeled by social demands. During human evolution, elements of intra-individual communication (cognitive structures and processes) became progressively linked to and developed with elements of interindividual communication (displays, calls). This integration requires tremendous expenditures in terms of time and other resources to develop and maintain in the members of a culture. Poets, artists, scientists, and other creative members of society may develop a higher degree of integration of these two symbol systems during ontogeny and work very hard to maintain this desegregration of abilities as adults. "The quality and range of intellectual performance demonstrated by any member of a species is in part a function of the breadth and intensity of the long- term education that individual has received" (Herman,1986). The role education plays in a species' representational and communicative systems cannot be overlooked. Nonlanguage-trained animals perform worse in tasks which require complex manipulation or mental representations than language-trained animals in similar tasks (Premack, 1985, see above). Language- trained dolphin & signing human both process patterns hierarchically, more so than controls (Shyan & Herman,1987). As with apes, we must admit that there is no convincing evidence for a sophisticated language in the natural communications of dolphins. However, we must also admit that the basic component(s) of dolphin signaling is still largely unknown (Smith,1986). Proponents of continuity theory can take comfort from other findings, such as mimicry, observational learning, protocultural influences on behavior, pedagogy, and the attribution of minds in others: all of which are telltale signs of the partial integration of representational and communicative capacities of mammals.

-DK

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